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Was this an ending? The destruction of samples
and deletion of records from the UK Police
National DNA Database
DAVID SKINNER* AND MATTHIAS WIENROTH**
Abstract. Between December 2012 and September 2013 the United Kingdom government
oversaw one of the largest destructions of a collection of human-derived samples ever con-
ducted. Approximately 7,753,000 DNA samples and 1,766,000 DNA computerized profiles
associated with the UK’s policing National DNA Database (NDNAD) were destroyed or
deleted. This paper considers this moment of exceptional erasure and the consequent implemen-
tation of new processes for routinely discarding and keeping samples and their associated com-
puter records. It is divided into two parts. The first discusses the rapid growth of the NDNAD;
the changing legal, ethical and political landscape within which it was promoted and contested;
and the developments that led to the decision to limit its scope. The second shifts focus to the
operational challenge of implementing the destruction of samples and deletion of records. The
NDNAD case allows us to examine the labour and continuing uncertainties involved in erasure
of biological data and the emerging norms and practices associated with collecting DNA in dif-
fering formats. It also sheds new light on the importance, interconnection and ongoing instabil-
ity of the ethical and practical biovalue of genetic collections: as the paper argues, far from
ending the NDNAD, a more rigorous regime of erasure has helped, for the moment at least,
to secure its future.
Between December 2012 and September 2013 the United Kingdom (UK) government
oversaw one of the largest destructions of human-derived samples ever conducted.
Approximately 7,753,000 samples associated with the UK’s policing National DNA
Database (NDNAD) were destroyed. On 13 December 2012 Lord Taylor of
Holbeach, minister for criminal information in the Conservative and Liberal
Democrat coalition government, reported this in a Written Ministerial Statement to
Parliament as an important step towards the implementation of new legislation, the
Protection of Freedoms Act.
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Before the Act commences, it is necessary to destroy a significant amount of existing biometric
material that the Act would not allow to be retained. The first priority is the destruction of DNA
samples. A DNA sample is an individual’s biological material, containing all of their genetic
information. The Government does not want to retain the complete genetic makeup of any
of its citizens. Every DNA sample taken will be destroyed as soon as a DNA profile for use
on the database has been obtained from it.1
As Taylor also reported, alongside the wholesale destruction of samples, approximately
1,766,000 computer records containing DNA data – sequences of numbers representing
individuals’ genetic identities – were to be removed from the NDNAD. Moreover, from
this point onwards samples taken during investigations would be routinely destroyed
once a computerized profile had been derived from them.
Despite their magnitude, the proposed erasures commanded relatively little public
attention and took place without fanfare. This contrasted strikingly with the theatricality
and publicity that two years previously had marked the ending of the ill-fated UK
Identity Card Register, when approximately five hundred hard-disk drives and a
hundred back-up tapes containing the details of fifteen thousand people were magnetic-
ally wiped, smashed, shredded and incinerated. Some of this work was done by then
Home Office minister Damian Green for the benefit of the attending media.2
This paper examines the developments that led to the quiet destruction of DNA
samples and the deletion of records, and the consequent reconfiguration of the
NDNAD from a distributed, permanent and ever-growing collection of samples and
their data doubles to a primarily computer-based resource. Our intention is to draw
wider lessons from the NDNAD about the changing meanings of collecting, curating
and ‘ending’ in an era of biobanking, digitalization and surveillance.3 The NDNAD
case highlights the increasing involvement of the state in the life sciences as a funder,
user and also regulator, developing legal and governmental infrastructures for the cur-
ation of biodata. Given its status as an instrument of the criminal-justice system with
important bearing on life chances and civil liberties, the NDNAD is particularly sensitive
to political and legal challenge and contestation. The NDNAD case thus also highlights
the differing cultural, legal and ethical standards relating to different sorts of collections
and different categories of media in those collections. It also reveals something about
‘genetic exceptionalism’:4 in the UK other police repositories of biometric information
– fingerprints, footprints, facial images – have not received the same level of concern
1 Home Office and Rt Hon. James Brokenshire, ‘James Brokenshire’s speech on Chapter 1 of the Protection
of Freedoms Act 2012’, 2012, at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/james-brokenshires-speech-on-chapter-1-
of-the-protection-of-freedoms-act-2012, accessed 9 November 2018.
2 Home Office and Rt Hon. Damian Green, ‘ID card database destroyed’, 2011, at www.gov.uk/
government/news/id-card-database-destroyed, accessed 1 December 2018.
3 RobinWilliams and Paul Johnson, ‘Circuits of surveillance’, Surveillance & Society (2004) 2(1), pp. 1–14;
Michael Lynch, Simon A. Cole, RuthMcNally and Kathleen Jordan, Truth Machine: The Contentious History
of DNA Fingerprinting, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010; Richard Tutton and Mairi Levitt,
‘Health and wealth, law and order: banking DNA against disease and crime’, in R. Hindmarsh and
B. Prainsack (eds.), Genetic Suspects: Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 85–104.
4 Williams and Johnson, op. cit. (3).
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and attention as the NDNAD. Genetic collections – not just in forensics but also in bio-
medicine and genealogy – disrupt commonly held distinctions between bodily material
and bodily information and their distinct associated cultural, legal and ethical frames.
The NDNAD case allows us to examine this disruption, as well as emerging norms
and practices associated with holding DNA in differing formats – a full biological
sample and a reduced numerical profile – by the state.
By discussing endings in genetic collections, this paper highlights significant gaps in
existing academic work on the new life sciences. The copious number of social and his-
torical studies of ‘biobanking’ contains only a tiny subset of literature on erasures and
endings.5 In an area driven by notions of growth and promise there is a reluctance to con-
sider the ‘failure’, lifespan or limitation of projects.6 Indeed, operational research sug-
gests that many managers of biobanks are unwilling to plan for the future
contingency of dismantling or ending their collections.7 Similarly, there is a tendency
to conduct academic, ethical and legal debates (including those about desirability and
the optimal size of collections) in isolation from the practicalities of the collection, reten-
tion, movement and use of materials and information. Only a very few studies consider
the care, effort and negotiation required to close or curtail a biobank and the consequent
destruction or redistribution of samples.8 Similarly, while the rapid growth of national
forensic databases has excited considerable debate and critique, this has largely been
conducted in isolation from consideration of the practicalities of retention and/or shrink-
age. As we will show, the story of the NDNAD is intriguing in part because of what it
reveals about the difficulties of enacting the results of legal, political and ethical delibera-
tions about the scope and format of this type of collection, but also how such deliberative
infrastructures and discourses can emerge in order to prevent, ameliorate or reframe pro-
cesses of ending.
After an opening conceptual discussion, this paper is organized in two parts. The first
discusses the growth of the NDNAD, the changing ethical and political landscape within
which it was promoted and contested, and the developments that led to the decision to
limit its scope. The second part shifts focus from ethics, politics and policy making to the
operational challenge of the consequent mass destruction of samples and deletion of
records and the implementation of new processes for routinely discarding and keeping
5 On the commercial failure of biobanks and ownership of results see Heidi C. Howard, Bartha Maria
Knoppers and Pascal Borry Howard, ‘Blurring lines: the research activities of direct‐to‐consumer genetic
testing companies raise questions about consumers as research subjects’, EMBO Reports (2010) 11(8),
pp. 579–582; Ma’n H. Zawati and Amélie Rioux, ‘Biobanks and the return of research results: out with the
old and in with the new?’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2011) 39(4), pp. 614–620.
6 Erik Aarden, ‘Projecting and producing “usefulness” of biomedical research infrastructures; or why the
Singapore Tissue Network closed’, Science and Public Policy (2017) 44(6), pp. 753–762.
7 Jean R. Cadigan, Teresa P. Edwards, Dragana Lassiter, Arlene M. Davis and Gail E. Henderson,
‘“Forward-thinking” in US biobanking’, Genetic Testing and Molecular Biomarkers (2017) 21(3), pp. 148–
154.
8 Neil Stephens and Rebecca Dimond, ‘Closure of a human tissue biobank: individual, institutional, and
field expectations during cycles of promise and disappointment’, New Genetics and Society (2015) 34(4),
pp. 417–436; Stephens and Dimond, ‘Unexpected tissue and the biobank that closed: an exploration of
value and the momentariness of bio-objectification processes’, Life Sciences, Society and Policy (2015)
11(1), pp. 1–15, 14.
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genetic samples and their associated computer profiles. In the concluding remarks, we
return to the overarching theme of endings, reflecting on the different dimensions of ‘bio-
value’ that have framed this unprecedented destruction of samples and deletion of pro-
files.9 As we will argue, this case allows wider reflection on varied types and scales of
erasure, in particular the different expectations of preservation and ending associated
with digital and with corporeal collections. It also highlights the role of forward-
looking imaginaries in contemporary discussions of collections: the potential of DNA
to be put to yet-to-be envisaged uses in the future is cited as an argument both for the
preservation and for the curtailment of the NDNAD.
Bioinformation, biovalue and forensic DNA databases
National DNA databases bring together two features of contemporary collecting and
archiving: the assembly and use by governments of data about current and potential
future populations in their jurisdictions, and the ‘banking’ of biological information.
National forensic databases have features in common with other contemporary
genetic collections in biomedicine and science, but the latter collections tend to have
been built on voluntary enrolment. By contrast, national forensic DNA databases
largely rest on compulsory donation. Concerns about their size draw in part from the
seriousness of the implications of the retention of DNA and increased awareness of
the troubling ways in which compulsory sampling produces databases that are skewed
along lines of age, class, gender and ethnicity.10
The development of statistics, computing power and their associated institutions and
cadres of experts has a history that stretches back long before the ‘information revolu-
tion’ or recent attention to notions of Big Data.11 The NDNAD, however, epitomizes
new forms of collecting. As computer and life sciences have become increasingly
entangled, forensics, genomics and biometrics depend on the processing of large quan-
tities of bodily and other personal information.12 Bronwyn Parry and Beth
Greenhough define bioinformation as ‘all information, no matter how constituted,
arising from the analysis of biological organisms and their behaviour’.13 This catch-all
definition is, however, very broad; it is helpful for our purposes to consider the specifi-
cities of bioinformation that lie in its capacity, also highlighted by Parry and
Greenhough, to be ‘materialized in different ways at different points in existence’ and
to operate simultaneously across different data and life-science registers. The translation
9 Robert Mitchell and Catherine Waldby, ‘National biobanks: clinical labour, risk production, and the
creation of biovalue’, Science, Technology & Human Values (2010) 35(3), pp. 330–355.
10 David Skinner ‘“The NDNAD has no ability in itself to be discriminatory”: ethnicity and the governance
of the UK National DNA Database’, Sociology (2013) 47(5), pp. 976–992.
11 Elena Aronova, ‘Geophysical datascapes of the Cold War: politics and practices of the World Data
Centers in the 1950s and 1960s’, Osiris (2017) 32(1), pp. 307–327; Dan Bouk, ‘The history and political
economy of personal data over the last two centuries in three acts’, Osiris (2017) 32(1), pp. 85–106.
12 Peter A. Chow-White and Miguel García-Sancho, ‘Bidirectional shaping and spaces of convergence:
interactions between biology and computing from the first DNA sequencers to global genome databases’,
Science, Technology, & Human Values (2012) 37(1), pp. 124–164.
13 Bronwyn Parry and Beth Greenhough, Bioinformation, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 8.
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of biological tissue into manageable ‘samples’ and ‘records’ is realized in processes of
selection, extraction, organization and stabilization; there is no a priori utility; rather
it is created through the labour (and tensions) inherent in the combination and transla-
tion between these varied formats.
In the UK and the USA the regulation of holdings of biological material has been
shaped in response to a series of human-tissue scandals in the 1980s and 1990s. These
related to the storage and exploitation of bodily remains and data without permission
from donors. Much of the resulting regulation in the field of biomedicine operates on
a distinction between matter derived from the human body and textual information
about that material and the persons from which it was extracted.14 According to this dis-
tinction, human tissue is a unique and finite resource for learning truths about the body,
while information can be anonymized, reduced, replicated, shared and interpreted in
infinite ways. This distinction between tissue and text is blurred in the case of DNA.
For some, DNA has a unique status as the informational essence of the person. As
Parry and Cathy Gere have argued, ‘In the case of DNA archives we have resources
that seem to be both physically and informationally infinite, replicable any number of
times without being used up, but also replete with potential for different kinds of ana-
lysis.’15 This genetic exceptionalism (expressed in key legislation such the UK’s
Human Tissue Act 2004) makes the NDNAD a particularly interesting case for examin-
ing processes of curation, destruction and deletion.
Biovalue
One advantage of situating the NDNAD and other genetic repositories in wider discus-
sions of collection and curation is that it opens up new questions about how bioinforma-
tion comes to be and remain useful and usable in specific contexts. Scholarship on
collections reminds us that, in this, ethical governance is not an impediment, or an
add-on, but is crucial to the development and maintenance of what Mitchell and
Waldby term ‘biovalue’.16 This concept refers to the inscription of intrinsic value and
explicit worth into biomaterials and their various uses (including analysis, retention,
expanded/secondary uses and sharing). Biovalue tends to be framed in practical or eco-
nomic terms; however, these dimensions are dependent on the negotiation of ethical
worth expressed in terms of cultural, societal, institutional and individual values,
norms, rights, obligations and interests. A crucial consequence of this is that the
ethical value of a collection requires continual work and can vary across time and
between locations. Collected material risks becoming unusable in a changed social and
political context because the original ways in which it was assembled are now deemed
unethical. The risk is that a genetic collection will, without an ethical imprimatur,
14 Bronwyn Parry and Cathy Gere, ‘Contested bodies: property models and the commodification of human
biological artefacts’, Science as Culture (2006) 15(2), pp. 139–158.
15 Parry and Gere, op. cit. (14), p. 153.
16 Mitchell and Waldby, op. cit. (9).
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become unusable or, in Emma Kowal’s phrase, ‘orphan DNA’.17 Joanna Radin and
Kowal discuss the ‘ethical regimes’ – bureaucratic structures and systems as well as inter-
personal relationships and values – that have facilitated scientific collections. Their com-
parison of US and Australian cases highlights the effort put into aligning social and
technical orders in these regimes; the use of collections of biological material reflects
‘variable and mutating’ understandings of citizenship, scientific authority and politics.18
Forensic DNA databases
Forensics generally describes the use of scientific methods and technologies for purposes
of security and criminal justice, including the investigation of crime.19 Since the mid-
1990s, centrally governed forensic DNA databases have been established around the
world.20 Police forensic DNA databases are now amongst the largest contemporary
repositories of bioinformation. They must be considered both as manifestations of
shared legal, policing and scientific practices, and as distinctive national projects that
reflect particular understandings of the state and its subjects, security and criminal-
justice needs, utility and cost of databasing, and data governance. There are significant
points of cooperation and convergence between forensic databases in different countries,
but they vary in their history, composition, management and operation.21
The development and growth of mass forensic DNA databases is a significant shift in
policing practice,22 driven by what Robin Williams terms the ‘forensic imaginary’: a
belief in the capacity of science to improve fundamentally the efficiency and accuracy
of crime detection.23 Investment in databases rests on a powerful scientific and legal
17 Emma Kowal, ‘Orphan DNA: indigenous samples, ethical biovalue and postcolonial science’, Social
Studies of Science (2013) 43(4), pp. 577–597.
18 Joanna Radin and Emma Kowal, ‘Indigenous blood and ethical regimes in the United States and
Australia since the 1960s’, American Ethnologist (2015) 42(4), pp. 749–765.
19 For detailed histories see Paul Johnson, Paul Martin and Robin Williams, ‘Genetics and forensics: a
sociological history of the National DNA Database’, Science Studies (2003) 16(2), pp. 22–37; Michael
Lynch, Simon A. Cole, Ruth McNally and Kathleen Jordan, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of
DNA Profiling, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008; Robin Williams and Paul Johnson,
‘Wonderment and dread: representations of DNA in ethical disputes about forensic DNA databases’, New
Genetics and Society (2004) 23(2), pp. 205–223.
20 H.M. Wallace, A.R. Jackson, J. Gruber and A.D. Thibedeau, ‘Forensic DNA databases ethical and legal
standards: a global review’, Egyptian Journal of Forensic Sciences (2014) 4(3), pp. 57–63.
21 Nina Amelung, Filipa Queiros and Helena Machado, ‘Studying ethical controversies around genetic
surveillance technologies: a comparative approach to the cases of Portugal and the UK’, 2017, at https://
estudogeral.sib.uc.pt//handle/10316/41955, accessed 5 November 2018; Victor Toom, ‘Forensic DNA
databases in England and the Netherlands: governance, structure and performance compared’, New
Genetics & Society (2012) 31(3), pp. 311–322; Joelle Vailly, ‘The politics of suspects’ geo-genetic origin in
France: the conditions, expression, and effects of problematisation’, BioSocieties (2017) 12(1), pp. 66–88.
22 Victor Toom, ‘Producing suspects: the politics of the National DNA Database of England and Wales’,
Science as Culture (2010) 19(3), pp. 387–391.
23 Robin Williams, ‘DNA databases and the forensic imaginary’, in Hindmarsh and Prainsack, op. cit. (3),
pp. 131–152.
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consensus about the reliability of DNA matching to resolve questions of identity.24
National forensic databases entail more than this, however: they are, using the termin-
ology of the introduction to this special issue, ‘working collections’ that enable continual
population surveillance via the speculative searching of genetic data in the hope of
matching a database profile to crime-scene DNA.25 People under genetic surveillance
have two existences: both as a corporeal entity and as a computerized ‘data double’.26
In the operation of forensic DNA databases this is expressed in two related forms of cur-
ation, the processing and storage of the human samples and other traces collected from
crime scenes, and the management of computerized profiles derived from those samples.
The headline term ‘database’ can obscure the complex, heterogeneous and distributed
systems involved in, for example, the extraction of samples, their movement and
storage and their computerization.
Within this context, the biovalue of forensic collections is constituted not only in their
effectiveness in solving or preventing crime but also through professional standards,
legal frameworks and ethical legitimacy. Forensic collections have developed over
time through a combination of serendipity and purposive sampling focused on shifting
understandings of ‘suspect populations’. Their growth has – at different times and
places – prompted a range of ethical concerns. These relate to the sizes of databases;
their contributions to security and criminal justice; what the appropriate criteria might
be for collection, retention and use of samples and data; and how best to address
questions of the privacy and ownership of those samples and data. Consequent
debates have often centred on two troubled concepts: (i) the notion that it is possible
and desirable to achieve a ‘balance’ between state power and civil liberties, and (ii) in
achieving that balance, the notion that the size and criteria of databases should be ‘pro-
portionate’ to their risks and benefits.27
Given this paper’s focus on the role of archiving, preserving and ending of collections,
it is helpful to reflect on the multiple notions of time in this story. Forensic DNA data-
bases have been promissory objects, driving expectations of better outcomes in the
future. Criteria for inclusion in databases generally relate to prior contact with the crim-
inal-justice system – typically arrest, prosecution or conviction for a crime. The retention
of DNA is justified on the basis of an anticipated heightened risk of future serious crim-
inal behaviour. Thus underlying the development of forensic databases are forward-
looking predictive, deterrent and precautionary logics that fold into other assumptions
24 Johnson, Martin andWilliams, op. cit. (19); Lynch et al., op. cit. (3); Toom, op. cit. (21); RobinWilliams
and Matthias Wienroth, ‘Identity, mass fatality and forensic genetics’,New Genetics and Society (2014) 33(3),
pp. 257–276.
25 RobinWilliams andMatthiasWienroth, ‘Social and ethical aspects of forensic genetics: a critical review’,
Forensic Science Review (2017), 29(2), pp. 145–170.
26 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, ‘The surveillant assemblage’, British Journal of Sociology
(2000) 51(4), pp. 605–622.
27 RobinWilliams and Paul Johnson, ‘Inclusiveness, effectiveness and intrusiveness: issues in the developing
uses of DNA profiling in support of criminal investigations’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2006) 33(3),
pp. 234–247.
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about past behaviour justifying the continuing curtailment of civil liberties.28 In add-
ition, the recording of people on the database is, in some cases, itself assumed to act
as a deterrent to future criminal activity, although there is no evidence for such an effect.
The NDNAD: growth and challenge
The UK National DNA Database (NDNAD), operational from April 1995, was one of
the first forensic databases in the world. It remains one of the largest (certainly per
capita) and most-accessed. The NDNAD is managed by the Home Office and holds
genetic records from all police forces in England and Wales, and from the police DNA
databases in Scotland and in Northern Ireland.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 enabled the police to take samples
from persons charged with ‘serious arrestable’ offences, initially ad hoc forensic blood
tests. In 1989, the Home Affairs Select Committee called for the establishment of a
DNA database ‘[o]nce a method of encoding DNA profiles has been established [and]
provided that the expensive computer equipment [is] available’.29 The NDNAD was
made technically possible by the discovery and subsequent development of short
tandem repeat (STR) polymorphisms as biomarkers from 1991.30 These biomarkers,
also called loci, are encoded as a string of standardized numbers, the DNA profile,
which can be stored easily and made searchable for comparison with DNA profiles gen-
erated from traces found at crime scenes and from other sources, including other DNA
databases, and databanks of biological material.31
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994 provided the legislative
basis for the NDNAD, giving police the power to collect, without individual consent,
DNA samples from persons charged with a ‘recordable’ offence. While, previously,
DNA collection included drawing of blood, the taking of DNA via a swab of the
inner cheek now became available and was deemed a ‘non-invasive’ procedure.32 The
CJPOA also legislated for the indefinite retention of DNA profiles from persons con-
victed of recordable offences, while at the same time required the destruction of
samples and profiles of all those not convicted or cautioned once the investigation had
ended.33 The NDNAD, therefore, began as a collection of samples taken from crime
28 Martin Innes and Alan Clarke, ‘Policing the past: cold case studies, forensic evidence and retroactive
social control’, British Journal of Sociology (2009) 60(3), pp. 543–563.
29 House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, ‘Science and technology: seventh
report (session 2004–05)’, 2005, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/96/
9602.htm, accessed 1 May 2019.
30 Albert Edwards, Andrew Civitello, Holly A. Hammond and C. Thomas Caskey, ‘DNA typing and
genetic mapping with trimeric and tetrameric tandem repeats’, American Journal of Human Genetics (1991)
49(4), p. 746.
31 John M. Butler, Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology, and Genetics of STRMarkers, Burlington,
MA: Academic Press, 2005, pp. 85–122.
32 In some other countries the taking of a mouth swab is considered invasive and requires donor consent.
For discussion of the French example see Vailly, op. cit. (21).
33 Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations,
Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2008.
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scenes and from persons, and of profiles derived from these samples. It was a distributed
system where samples would be stored in what were essentially small local cryogenic bio-
banks held by the police forces that had collected the samples and by forensic service pro-
viders (FSPs) – including the national Forensic Science Service (until 2012) and non-state
providers, notably LGC Ltd, Orchid Cellmark Ltd, and Key Forensic Services Ltd – who
analysed and stored them. DNA profiles, on the other hand, would be held in a central
digitized database.
‘Virtually the entire active criminal population’: rapid expansion
The rapid expansion of the NDNAD was driven both by then world-leading British
forensic science, enabling novel ways of using DNA, and, from the year 2000
onwards, by the political will to profile ‘virtually the entire active criminal population’.34
These led to a concerted infrastructural investment by successive Labour governments
via the DNA Expansion Programme and the Forensic Integration Strategy.35 The
initial growth of the NDNAD had taken place at a time when recorded offences were
falling but fear of crime was intensifying: these were accompanied by new responses
by the police and courts to crime and other kinds of emerging security threats.36 The
flip side of hopes for genetics was therefore growing fear of disorder, crime and terrorism
and, debatably, government attempts to ‘govern through crime’.37 The expansion of the
NDNAD fitted well with central preoccupations of the then self-styledNew Labour gov-
ernment’s law and order project: being ‘tough on crime’, tackling ‘antisocial behaviour’
and ‘managing risk’. This period saw more spending on policing and an increased
volume and reach of legislation. In both cases, we can see a widening of focus from pro-
blems of crime to the prevention of social disorder.
Early in the development of the NDNAD there were a number of significant legal cases
which raised concerns about the grounds under which a genetic sample could be retained
and used as evidence.38 These challenges were ultimately overruled in the courts, reflect-
ing a growing consensus not only about the reliability of genetic identification but also
that the NDNAD was an important tool for the management of crime. Under the DNA
Expansion Programme the population of the database grew from c.737,000 to
5,617,604 subject profiles between 2000 and 2008.
As Table 1 sets out, a series of legislative changes provided the basis for this rapid
growth. The changes enabled the ever-broader collection and indefinite retention of
DNA samples and profiles under a wider range of circumstances. These included
34 Tony Blair in 2000, as cited by Helen Wallace, ‘The UK National DNA Database: balancing crime
detection, human rights and privacy’, EMBO reports (2006) 7(1S), pp. 26–30.
35 Williams and Johnson, op. cit. (3); Carole McCartney, ‘The DNA expansion programme and criminal
investigation’, British Journal of Criminology (2005) 46(2), pp. 175–192.
36 Carole McCartney, Robin Williams and Tim Wilson, The Future of Forensic Bioinformation, London:
Nuffield Foundation, 2010.
37 Simon A. Cole, ‘How much justice can technology afford? The impact of DNA technology on equal
criminal justice’, Science and Public Policy (2007) 34(2), pp. 95–107.
38 Williams and Johnson, op. cit. (3).
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people charged with a recordable offence but either not prosecuted or later cleared, those
arrested for a recordable offence (from the age of ten) independent of further
prosecution, those deceased, those from whom a body part originated for identification
purposes, those volunteers participating in police mass screenings or elimination
checks, and those issued with a penalty notice for disorder. Under the Terrorism
Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (implemented in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the USA), the NDNAD also expanded to hold the
genetic records of suspects defined under the Schedule 7 procedure of counterterrorism
legislation.
By 2009, the NDNAD held records approximating 10 per cent of the population of
England and Wales and in the process had expanded beyond its original remit to
profile the criminally active population. As it grew rapidly, its advocates emphasized
its broad potential to support fast and robust identification of suspects, but also to
help exonerate those found not to be guilty, to reduce investigative costs and to offer
Table 1. The expanding database – enacted DNA inclusion and retention.
Legislation Inclusion criteria Retention Number of DNA
records*
Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act
(CJPOA) 1994
Cautioned for or
convicted of a
qualifying offence
Indefinite retention (profiles)
Deletion of all other profiles
after investigation or
prosecution
1,611,445**
(31 March 2002)
Criminal Justice &
Police Act (CJPA)
2001
Charged with a
qualifying offence
Volunteering a sample
Indefinite retention (profiles and
samples)
Inability to withdraw consent
once given
2,099,964***
(31 March 2003)
Criminal Justice Act
(CJA) 2003
Arrested for a
qualifying offence
Volunteering a sample
Retention from age ten until age
100
3,085,766****
(31 March 2005)
Serious Organised
Crime and Police
Act (SOCA) 2005
Identification of
deceased, and of
body parts
4,428,376*****
(31 March 2007)
Notes:
* Cf. GeneWatch UK (2010), who point out that approximately 10 per cent of listed figures will be made up
of replicates: www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/UK_DNA_detections.
pdf, accessed 17 April 2018.
** Derived from data provided in the National DNA Database, ‘Annual Report 2002–03’, p. 11, at www.
genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/NDNAD_Annual_Report_02_03.pdf,
accessed 1 May 2019.
*** The National DNA Database, op. cit., p. 11.
**** TheNational DNADatabase, ‘Annual Report 2004–2005’, figure on p. 6, retention data on pp. 34–35,
at www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/NDNAD_AR_04_05.pdf, accessed
1 May 2019.
***** The National DNA Database, ‘Annual Report 2006–2007’, p. 2, at www.gov.uk/government/pub-
lications/ndnad-annual-reports, accessed 1 May 2019.
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a deterrent to (would-be) criminals.39 Criminal-justice stakeholders not only successfully
argued for the merits of using biological materials on databases for security and justice
purposes, but also made the case to government and Parliament for the ongoing, future
benefits of mass DNA retention. Continuing innovation in the field of forensic genetics
supported expectations that the capacity and value of the NDNAD would only grow.
This fuelled a belief that a larger database would provide better outcomes in terms of
justice and social order. In other words, during the initial expansionary phase the biovalue
of the NDNAD rested on compelling claims as to its current and future utility as a means
of managing crime and disorder: claims that initially bypassed questions about the ethical
or economic value of an ever-growing database. However, the significant expansion gen-
erated an increasingly high-profile discourse of contestation around the NDNAD.
‘Eroding public trust in policing’: sustaining legitimacy
Relating to the retention regime, critical commentators pointed to concerns over proportion-
ality, individual privacy and dignity, and equality, as well as to the NDNAD’s lack of trans-
parent governance. In addition, many challenged assertions of enhanced crime control
derived from the existence and growth of such databases.40 One of the most active critics
of the NDNAD at that time was GeneWatch UK, a not-for-profit organization that moni-
tored genetic developments of public interest, and extended its original focus of genetics
in agriculture andmedicine to the forensic domain in the early 2000s. The organization pro-
vided in-depth commentaries and information on the NDNAD,41 significantly contributing
to the public debate around the rapid expansion of the database. Its director, Helen
Wallace, said in 2009, ‘The massive expansion of Britain’s DNA database has failed to
deliver genuine benefits in terms of solving crime, instead eroding public trust in policing’.42
Contestations such as these had a particular flavour and momentum in part because
the initial establishment and development of the database took place with little public
discussion or statutory regulation.43 As a result, the UK government’s Home Office,
39 For example Lyn Fereday (ed.), ‘Transforming the use of forensics through the DNA Expansion
Programme: beyond DNA in the UK – integration and harmonisation’, Newport, South Wales: Home
Office Science Policy Unit, 2004; Home Office, ‘Keeping the right people on the DNA database’, 2009, at
http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2009-2788/DEP2009-2788.pdf, accessed 1 May 2019;
House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, op. cit. (29).
40 For example, Anthony M. Cutter, ‘To clear or to convict? The role of genomics in criminal justice’,
Genomics, Society and Policy (2006) 2(1), pp. 1–15; Kristina Staley, The Police National DNA Database:
Balancing Crime Detection, Human Rights and Privacy, Windsor: GeneWatch UK, 2005; Carole
McCartney, ‘The DNA expansion programme and criminal investigation’, British Journal of Criminology
(2006) 46(2), pp. 175–192; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘The forensic use of bioinformation: ethical
issues’, 2007, available at http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/bioinformation, accessed 1 May 2019.
41 ‘The UK Police National DNA Database’, at www.genewatch.org/sub-539478, accessed 12 December
2018.
42 ‘GeneWatch PR: response to government DNA proposals’, at www.genewatch.org/article.shtml?als[cid]
=564539&als[itemid]=565571, accessed 1 December 2018.
43 Dana Wilson-Kovacs, David Wyatt and Christine Hauskeller, ‘“A Faustian bargain?” Public voices in
forensic DNA technologies and the National DNA Database’, New Genetics and Society (2012) 31(3),
pp. 285–298.
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and the NDNAD Strategy Board, found themselves needing to reassert the legitimacy of
the NDNAD. Increasingly they made claims of utility and proportionality through
mechanisms such as the National DNA Database annual report (with the first publicly
accessible report published in 2007).44 Initially, however, the primary response to con-
cerns was the development of formal governance structures that emphasized the similar-
ity of the forensic database to biomedical biobanks and enrolled new epistemic
communities outside forensic science, from philosophy, medicine and research ethics,
as well as from law and criminology, to manage public concerns.45 This included the for-
mation, in 2007, of the role of the Forensic Science Regulator,46 focused on ensuring the
effectiveness of the criminal-justice system through UK forensic science services, and of
the NDNAD Ethics Group. Both were set up as advisory non-departmental public bodies
tasked with providing advice to the Home Office. The Ethics Group focused on explor-
ing the impact on society of DNA retention and uses. The first report by the group, in
2008, stated that it sought to ‘balance the interests of public protection through the
forensic use of DNA with the inevitable invasions of privacy and personal labelling
that this causes’.47
In late 2007, the UK’s non-governmental equivalent to a national ethics commission,
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, published The Forensic Uses of Bioinformation:
Ethical Issues. This report argued for a rights-based approach in the balance of public
security and personal liberty, and raised concerns about the rapid expansion of police
rights to take, retain and use biomaterials from individuals. In 2009, the UK Human
Genetics Commission (HGC), an advisory non-departmental public body, delivered its
report, Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?. The HGC drew on insights from two
public engagement projects which highlighted the widely perceived novelty of the
NDNAD and inconsistencies in the way that the database was governed. It proposed
strengthening the role of the NDNAD Ethics Group, and recommended establishing
an independent oversight body for the use of biological material in the criminal-justice
system. These developments reflected emerging recognition of a special status of the
NDNAD as population surveillance tool and, in the light of public awareness of its exist-
ence and scale, the need for further and continuous scrutiny of its curation practices.
‘Adopt the protections of the Scottish model’: how to shrink the NDNAD?
As public and policy debate about the NDNAD continued, a landmark ruling by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in S & Marper v. UK (2008) stated that
44 Collected at ‘National DNA Database documents’, at www.gov.uk/government/collections/dna-
database-documents.
45 Tutton and Levitt, op. cit. (3), p. 95.
46 Forensic Science Regulator, ‘Forensic Science Regulator, business plan: 2008 to 2009 and 2010 to 2011’,
2008, at www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-science-regulator-newsletters-and-reports, accessed 1
May 2019.
47 The NDNAD Ethics Group, ‘1st annual report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database’, 2008, at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117615/
NDNAD_Ethics_Group_Annual_Report.pdf.
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the indefinite retention of biometric data from non-convicted persons for criminal-justice
purposes violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The two
complainants had unsuccessfully attempted to get their records deleted from UK national
databases after acquittal. The ECtHR took a different view to the UK courts and argued
that
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular
samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences … fails to
strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that the respondent
State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard.
The verdict gave particular weight to the argument that DNA presents a unique genetic
code, and that ‘retention of cellular samples is particularly intrusive given the wealth of
genetic and health information contained therein’.48
It was to be four years before the UK fully implemented the ECtHR’s ruling. A number
of factors contributed to this delay, including operational concerns about its practicality
and, in 2010, a change of government. There is no doubt, however, that initially the
Labour government sought a slow and in some respects minimal response to the judg-
ment. In May 2009, six months after the decision by the ECtHR, the Home Office
announced a consultation process, with the publication of the hundred-page document
‘Keeping the right people on the DNA database’. Its objective was to ‘develop a DNA
framework which has the support and confidence of the public and achieves a propor-
tionate balance between the rights of the individual and protection of the public’.49 In
some ways the Home Office proposals set out in this document exceeded the ECtHR
ruling as they envisaged the destruction of DNA samples that had been taken from sus-
pects on arrest, following the creation and upload of a computerized DNA profile. As
such, the Home Office was indirectly proposing a reduction of the distributed database
and of the local retention of crime-scene samples, focusing instead on a centralized com-
puter database of electronic DNA profiles. The consultation document also noted that
since the verdict by the ECtHR, DNA of children under ten on the database had been
removed, and would not be stored again in the future. Aside from these instances,
however, in other respects the Home Office sought to minimize the ECtHR judgment
by arguing for the importance of sufficient time to consider deletions, and offering a
raft of evidence to support their proposal that all DNA profiles should be retained for
six years (and in some cases for twelve years), even if the donor had not been convicted
of a crime.
The consultation engendered significant public debate. Although the ECtHR judgment
related to the retention of both fingerprints and DNA, this discussion focused almost
exclusively on the genetic database, and in particular the criteria to be used for retention
of computerized profiles. Broadsheet newspapers, notably The Guardian, The
Independent and the Daily Telegraph, took a sustained interest in this issue. Civil-
society groups such as Liberty, GeneWatch UK, Black Mental Health and the
48 ECtHR 1581 (2008) para. 120.
49 Home Office, op. cit. (39), p. 4.
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Runnymede Trust voiced concerns over the limited extent of changes offered by the
Home Office. The director of the civil rights group Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti,
viewed the proposals as not ‘necessarily a complete two fingers to the court of human
rights but it comes pretty close’.50 Key public bodies, including the Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, also raised con-
cerns. The latter challenged government data underlying the proposed new retention
periods for arrestees and cited findings of its 2007 report on the lack of evidence that
retaining DNA profiles from the non-convicted would significantly support crime-
detection rates. They also critiqued the lack of oversight and transparency in the pro-
posed regime.51
The Labour government had originally planned to enact its proposals without devel-
oping primary legislation, by delegating powers to ministers to regulate the retention, use
and destruction of forensic materials. However, reports in 2009 by the House of Lords
Select Committee on the Constitution and Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human
Rights both judged this approach unacceptable because of the importance of the issue
of retention of samples and profiles. In a Westminster Hall debate in late 2009, called
by then backbench Labour MP Diane Abbott, Abbott argued,
The DNA database is an extraordinary innovation, which has emerged sideways and incremen-
tally, without the full glare of parliamentary scrutiny, yet we have the biggest DNA database
per head of population in the world. It is extraordinary that a project with such ramifications
has not had the parliamentary scrutiny that it deserves.52
Eventually, in the last months of the Labour government, the proposed changes received
parliamentary scrutiny as part of the Crime and Security Bill. This proposed the eventual
destruction of all samples once a computerized profile had been derived and also six-year
(or in some specific cases twelve-year) retention of the profiles of adults arrested but not
convicted. The government argued that these criteria meant it had six years from the
passing of the legislation to destroy the current collection of samples and remove the pro-
files of the innocent from the database, although it anticipated that in practice this could
be completed by 2012.
The Crime and Security Act 2010 progressed through Parliament but its implementa-
tion was curtailed by the defeat of Labour in the 2010 general election, and the arrival of
the new coalition government whose approach reflected different priorities. The Liberal
Democrats and some MPs from the libertarian wing of the Conservative Party had been
at the forefront of criticism of what they termed the growing ‘database state’. This coin-
cided with another policy imperative, the desire to cut spending, and to reform sup-
posedly inefficient public services, including the policing and forensic services. The
Coalition Agreement committed to ‘adopt the protections of the Scottish model of
50 BBC, ‘Time limits on innocent DNA data’, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8037042.stm.
51 An archive of the manner of the responses to the consultation are collected at ‘Home Office DNA
consultation’, at www.genewatch.org/sub-564539, accessed 1 May 2019.
52 Diane Abbott, ‘Parliamentary debate on the DNA database’, 2009, at www.dianeabbott.org.uk/news/
speeches/news.aspx?p=102558.
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DNA retention’ for the NDNAD;53 the Scottish DNA database only retained DNA of
people convicted of offences. The coalition government’s Protections of Freedom Bill
amended the Crime and Security Act and proposed an alignment between England
and Wales and the Scottish model, requiring the deletion of all profiles of non-convicted
donors. The new bill also regularized and strengthened the governance and oversight of
the NDNAD, placing the NDNAD Strategy Board on a legal footing, and establishing
the Office of the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material. The
bill became law in 2012 but not without opposition. The shadow home secretary,
Yvette Cooper, claimed, ‘They are going too far on DNA retention and are going
against the evidence that shows it has a significant impact bringing serious criminals
to justice and exonerating innocent people.’54
Reconfiguring the NDNAD: exceptional and operational erasures
Although framed as a response to the ECtHR judgment, the retention and governance
regime that emerged from the Crime and Security Act 2010 and the Protection of
Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 went further than the ECtHR judgment required. A wider
set of concerns about the value and legitimacy of the database coalesced around this
legal response; these were practical (what is the most effective size and composition of
the database?), ethical (what is proportionate?) and economic (what is affordable?).
The elements of the PoFA relating to the NDNAD included the requirement to
destroy samples, cull a significant proportion of computerized profiles, and develop
new procedures for handling arrestee DNA in the future. With the development and
debate of the PoFA, discussions about the appropriate size and operation of the
NDNAD largely came to an end, but the Act had to be implemented and this required
negotiation and labour, not least in relation to questions of erasure.
At crunch points, practices of retention are scrutinized and open up potential revisions
in the modi operandi or continuing existence of collections. In the implementation of the
PoFA, we can identify three types of ‘ending’ that are of wider relevance to the discussion
of collections. (1) The PoFA prompted an existential destruction of almost the entire col-
lection of retained samples. (2) It required the exceptional one-off erasure of whole cat-
egories of computerized profiles. (3) The Act also addressed a type of collection
management that might be termed normal, or everyday, deletion: this term refers to
the ongoing, routine erasures integral to the efficient and compliant operation of most
biodata collections. These ‘daily deaths’ keep the overall archive structure alive. In the
case of the NDNAD, these endings include the deletions of locally held data once it
has been uploaded into the national system. They also include ‘housekeeping’ deletions
that, also in the name of efficiency, tidy up anomalies. As the database grew, this became
a significant issue. In 2008, the National Police Improvement Agency estimated that
53 HMgovernment, ‘The coalition: our programme for government’, 2010, https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/
coalition_programme_for_government.pdf, p. 11, accessed 6 November 2018.
54 Ian Dunt, ‘A new day for civil liberties? Coalition published freedom bill,’ 11 February 2011, at www.
politics.co.uk/news/2011/2/11/a-new-day-for-civil-liberties-coalition-publi, accessed 5 November 2018.
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13–14 per cent of all the records on the NDNAD were ‘replicates’, created when a
genetic profile was loaded onto the database on more than one occasion. Replication
could occur – the agency explained – ‘if the same person provided different names, or
different versions of their name, on separate arrests, or because profiles are upgraded’.55
Between 2008 and 2012 considerable work had been put into reducing rates of replica-
tion, and anecdotal reports suggest that the PoFA implementation presented another
opportunity to achieve this. Prior to the PoFA, although most DNA profiles and
samples were held indefinitely, the law stipulated that certain categories of record must
be deleted after use. These included those derived from samples voluntarily donated
by the public or police during an investigation for elimination purposes. Questions
about when to preserve or erase genetic samples and their data doubles had been, there-
fore, part and parcel of the operation of the NDNAD prior to the PoFA. But the PoFA
required more rigorous, varied and complicated forms of ending. The sections that
follow draw on publicly available NDNAD monitoring and governance documentation
and remind us that endings – be they existential, exceptional or everyday – are easier said
than done, requiring considerable organizational and operational energy.
The shift in tone and focus – from a discussion of ethics, policy and legislation to that
of implementation – is reflected in the Home Office’s ‘Impact Assessment’ of the pro-
posed changes. These documents associate ending (part of) the NDNAD collection
with financial savings – they contrast the cost of destroying a DNA sample (three
pence) with the annual cost of retaining a sample (ninety pence). But they also detail sig-
nificant additional costs to this destruction:
There would be a cost of around £300k to reprogram the computer software to delete DNA
profiles and fingerprint records. It would cost £4.3m to delete orphaned profiles. We estimate
that to destroy DNA samples would cost around £188k (one-off) plus a small amount per year
thereafter, while re-sampling those re-arrested (whose data would previously have been
retained) will cost approximately £2.3m annually. To destroy paper records of fingerprints
would cost around £6.0m (one-off) and 367k/year. There will also be a cost of £500k per
annum to cover the operating costs of the independent Commissioner for the Retention and
Use of Biometric Material.56
The implementation of the PoFA also required an agreed set of terms and definitions that
allowed a clear discursive and operational disaggregation of samples of bodily material
and computerized genetic profiles. A new official vocabulary distinguished a catch-all
category of ‘DNA data’ and within that subcategories of ‘DNA sample’, ‘DNA
profile’ and ‘associated data’.57 A variety of different actors were drawn into the
conduct and monitoring of sample destruction and profile deletion. These include
the NDNAD Strategy Board, the Ethics Group, the new biometrics commissioner,
55 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, A Surveillance Society? Fifth Report of Session 2007–08,
vol. 1, London: The Stationery Office, 2008, p. 78.
56 HomeOffice, ‘Retention of DNA& fingerprints by police impact assessment’, 2011, at www.parliament.
uk/documents/impact-assessments/IA12-004B.pdf, p. 2.
57 Home Office NDNAD Delivery Unit (NDU), ‘The NDNAD Strategy Board policy for access and use of
DNA samples, profiles and associated data’, 2015 at www.gov.uk/government/publications/access-and-use-of-
dna-samples-profiles-and-associated-data, accessed 4 July 2019.
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the United Kingdom Accreditation Service together with the Forensic Science Regulator
(who accredited and audited UK forensic science providers), the policing National
Delivery Unit, the Association of Chief Police Officers (now the National Police
Chiefs’ Council), and the Police National Computer.
‘Not a simple matter’: the existential destruction of samples and exceptional deletion of
profiles
The governance documentation (including reports by the biometrics commissioner,
reports and minutes of the Strategy Board and reports by the Association of Chief
Police Officers Criminal Records Office (ACRO)) has copious detail on the policies
and procedures for the operational management of the NDNAD. By contrast, there is
surprisingly little detail about the mass erasure of samples and profiles. A recent aca-
demic analysis of the implementation of the PoFA based on a systematic review of this
documentation mirrors this omission, making only passing mention of sample
destruction.58
Although the PoFA passed into law in May 2012, its ‘biometric’ provisions relating to
DNA and fingerprints were not brought into effect until 31 October 2013. In the mean-
time, a wide-ranging ‘cleansing’ exercise was coordinated by the Home Office, with a
view to ensuring that material would not be wrongfully held when those provisions
came into effect, and that DNA records would not be wrongly erased.59 The NDNAD
Strategy Board declared,
The implementation of the Protection of Freedoms Act is not a simple matter, involving signifi-
cant preparatory work and complex reprogramming of databases to ensure that each person’s
DNA and fingerprints are removed or retained correctly and at the right time.60
The existential destruction of the collection of DNA samples presented a number of
logistical challenges. One was that neither samples nor data were stored in a single
place. The distributed character of the forensic system inevitably meant that individual
police forces would hold biological material. In 2012–13, most forensic DNA samples
were processed by and retained on behalf of the police by three independent private
forensic science providers: LGC Ltd, Orchid Cellmark Ltd and Key Forensic Services
Ltd. The destruction of samples on the premises of the three forensic science providers
is reported to have begun in December 2012. However, there is scant information as
to how this was conducted beyond the insight that it took place in batches at weekends
(presumably in order not to interfere with the normal workings of the three laboratories
where the samples were held). The biometrics commissioner reported ‘no reason to
doubt the accuracy’ of ministerial claims that the destruction of samples had been
58 Aaron Opoku Amankwaa and CaroleMcCartney, ‘The UKNational DNADatabase: implementation of
the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012’, Forensic Science International (2018) 284, pp. 117–128.
59 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, Annual Report 2014, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387601/45428_Biometrics_Annual_Report_ACCESSIBLE.PDF,
accessed 5 November 2018.
60 NDNAD Strategy Board, ‘NDNAD annual report 2011–12’, 2013, at http://data.parliament.uk/
DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2013-0834/NDNADAnnualReport2011-12.pdf, accessed 5 November 2018.
Was this an ending? 115
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bjt.2019.7
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.25.204.246, on 08 Jun 2020 at 11:38:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
completed in compliance with legislation. The basis for that confidence rested to some
extent on the expectation of significant savings to forensic science providers if they no
longer had to offer the mass cold storage of samples:
The costs associated with the storage of millions of DNA samples were substantial and neither
FSPs [forensic science providers] nor police forces had or have a significant commercial incen-
tive to store large numbers of samples which could and should be destroyed. In those circum-
stances – and quite apart from the legal, reputational and other risks that would have been
involved if they had continued to hold samples when it was unlawful for them to do so – it
would perhaps be surprising if FSPs or forces had deliberately chosen not to comply with the
new retention/destruction regime.61
Whatever its logistical challenges, a benefit of the post-PoFA sample retention regime
was that the blanket criteria for destruction were relatively straightforward. In contrast,
delineating the category of computerized profiles of ‘the innocent’ in order to carry out
exceptional erasures was a more complex matter. To achieve this the NDNAD Strategy
Board outlined a phased approach to the mass deletion of profiles from the NDNAD
computer system (outlined in Table 2). A crucial issue was the need to check the past
arrest and conviction records held on the Police National Computer (PNC) against
those on the NDNAD. The order in which categories of profile were deleted reflects
the relative ease or difficulty of identifying records for erasure.
‘An impossible task’: the new retention schedule
As Table 2 suggests, the PoFA established a more complex regime for the retention of
DNA profiles and created a new category of records for routine, everyday deletion:
those of people arrested who were, however, at the end of the investigation, not
charged or else were charged but not convicted. In addition, certain categories of
records now had limited retention times (Table 3). The difficulty of implementing the
new ‘complicated’ rules of retention and deletion was highlighted by the biometrics com-
missioner in his 2014 report:
When the general rule is that all DNA profiles and fingerprints can be retained indefinitely, the
implementation of a retention regime is simple. However, when one is dealing with hundreds of
thousands of arrestees each year – and when retention or deletion of their DNA profiles and
fingerprints turns on the specific history of each individual arrestee – the implementation
problems are considerable.62
This required the development of new technical, legal and professional roles and proto-
cols to define, operationalize and audit both ‘innocence’ and ‘deletion’.
The PoFA allowed the police to take DNA samples from all persons arrested for a
recordable offence but stipulated that these samples should be routinely destroyed
once a profile has been derived and uploaded to the database. Police were, however,
allowed to keep DNA samples until six months after a criminal investigation and
61 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, op. cit. (59), p. 62.
62 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, op. cit. (59), p. 5.
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‘allied disclosure arrangements’were concluded.63 The law also allowed that, should the
circumstances of evidence indicate that the DNA sample be needed for future retesting,
or in cases of admissibility challenges, the chief investigating officer can apply to a district
judge or the biometrics commissioner for an order to retain the sample for up to a
maximum of thirty-six months.
The new retention criteria presented a range of operational, procedural and audit chal-
lenges. (1) How to ensure that, once a computerized profile has been produced, the ori-
ginal sample is destroyed? (2) How to ensure that profiles and their related samples
(if retained) are deleted within six months of an investigation ending and no further
action being taken? (3) How to ensure that arrangements are in place for earlier deletion
and for longer retention of samples and profiles in certain prescribed circumstances? The
biometrics commissioner readily admitted that he did not have the resources to system-
atically assure that the required changes had been implemented. The few visits that he
made to police services did seem to reveal issues with delivery. He reported that while
he was ‘impressed by the openness which forces have shown me’ it was evident that in
some forces his visits had ‘acted as a useful spur’ to strengthen procedures for the reten-
tion and processing of DNA samples.64
While some implementation challenges were clearly operational, others were
structural. One basic but important issue, for example, was how to determine when
an investigation was closed: this required the development of formal guidance from
the National Police Chiefs’ Council (formerly the Association of Chief Police
Table 2. Exceptional mass deletions of profiles from the NDNAD computers
Action Completed Deletions
Deletion of profiles where no link with the PNC could be established February 2013 504,000
Deletion of profiles belonging to individuals with a single arrest against
their name for which no further action was taken
April 2013 632,000
Deletion of profiles belonging to individuals with a single arrest against
their name where further action was taken, but there is no power to retain
their DNA
June 2013 204,000
Deletion of profiles belonging to individuals with more than one arrest but
no convictions or other circumstances which allow their DNA to be
retained
September 2013 426,000
Source:
Home Office, ‘NDNAD Strategy Board annual report 2012–13’, 2013, at https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/252885/NDNAD_Annual_Report_2012-
13.pdf, pp. 23–24, accessed 6 November 2018.
63 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, Annual Report 2016, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/644426/CCS207_Biometrics_Commissioner_ARA-
print.pdf, accessed 5 November 2018, p. 58.
64 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, Annual Report 2015, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/507104/54496_Biometrics_Commissioners_Report_
Print_Ready__3_.pdf, accessed 5 November 2018, p. 60.
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Officers).65 Similarly, new software was developed so that samples taken could be
quickly checked against the database, avoiding now illegal long-term retentions. In
2015, ACRO also launched a procedure for handling requests from the public for
early deletion from the database.
Other issues have proved intractable. An enduring set of problems relates to the need
to align forensic and police record computer systems so that profiles can be accurately
retained or deleted at the appropriate times. Reports from the biometrics commissioner
repeatedly discuss the difficulty of programming the PNC so that it could ‘automatically
drive’ the deletion of arrestee records only and always according to the specified rules
and time frame, and reflect on continued doubts as to whether entries onto the PNC
were accurate and up to date. The biometrics commissioner has openly acknowledged
that fully implementing the PoFA is consequently ‘an impossible task’ and that the
records of thousands of people have been wrongly retained and that a smaller number
of records have been wrongly erased:
Table 3. Biometric retention periods as defined under the Protection of Freedoms
Act 2012
Individuals convicted of an offence Fingerprint and DNA retention period
Adult convicted (including cautions, reprimands
and final warnings) of any recordable offence
Indefinite
Under-eighteen convicted (including cautions,
reprimands and final warnings) of a qualifying
offence
Indefinite
Under-eighteen convicted of a minor offence 1st conviction: five years (plus length of any custodial
sentence), or indefinite if the custodial sentence is five
years or more.
2nd conviction: indefinite
Individuals not convicted of an offence
Any age charged with but not convicted of a
qualifying offence
Normally deletion within six months of the end of an
investigation
Three years plus two-year extension if granted by
district judge
Any age arrested for but not charged with a
qualifying offence
Normally deletion within six months of the end of an
investigation
Three years if granted by biometrics commissioner plus
two-year extension if granted by district judge
Any age arrested for or charged with a minor
offence
None but speculatively searched against National
DNA Database (NDNAD) and national fingerprint
database (IDENT1)
Penalty notice for disorder Two years
Source:
Adapted from ACRO Criminal Records Office reports.
65 National Police Chief’s Council, ‘Deletion of records from national police systems’, 2015, at https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/430095/Record_Deletion_
Process.pdf.
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Given the pressures on police and other budgets and the need to prioritise resources, it is unsur-
prising that it was decided that the sensible course would instead be: to settle for a system
which, though generally producing appropriate results, would sometimes lead to material
being retained when it should in fact have been deleted; but to seek to mitigate the adverse
effects of that ‘compromise’ arrangement by (among other things) providing detailed guidance
to forces about checking the lawfulness of any matches with profiles or fingerprints on the
national databases before acting on them.66
Conclusion: the preservation of biovalue
Some of the objections and delays to the implementation of the ECtHR ruling in the case
of S&Marper v.UK (2008) related to the operational implementation and practicability
of the erasures and deletions it required: some insiders raised doubts as to whether the
existing storage system would allow selective profile deletions and also questioned
whether, in the era of data sharing and backups, a record can ever be said to have
fully disappeared. Given the existence of DNA as both bodily material and data
double, and the capacity for sharing and copying within computerized systems, what
constitutes the ‘ending’ of DNA records? Is it the destruction of a genetic sample, the
deletion of all its digital traces, the loss of its accessibility through computer searches,
or merely the taking away of its legal admissibility? While the PoFA has since been
enacted, the implementation of existential, exceptional and everyday endings has in
practice left some ‘orphan’ DNA which has officially disappeared but actually persists,
albeit in a state of limbo that should make it unusable.
As the introduction suggests, the reconfiguration and shrinking of the NDNAD
attracted relatively little public attention. This is intriguing because the biovalue of col-
lections such as the NDNAD is largely anticipatory and rooted in promises about future
utility. Despite the scale of the destruction of samples and deletions of records and the
weight of promissory expectations associated with forensic genetics, surprisingly few stake-
holders or commentators were prepared openly to voice concerns about the long-term con-
sequences of existential and exceptional endings. Emerging forms of forensic science may
create as yet unforeseen reasons why deletion of records and destruction of samples may
one day be deemed to be short-sighted. For some supporters of the PoFA this potential
for future exploitation was, on the contrary, a rationale for destruction:
As biological science develops rapidly, so the genetic and medical information that can be read
from a person’s DNA is growing year upon year. With this increased knowledge and informa-
tion, the dangers of a government holding collections of DNA samples increases too.67
This rhetoric of future-proofing civil liberties is tempered in later documents with the lan-
guage of proportionality and efficiency. Junior ministers and the NDNAD Strategy
Board are keen to show how the truncation of the database had not lessened its effect-
iveness, citing year-on-year increases in the rate of matches to the database. Nonetheless
we can see two contrary imperatives at play in this and other forms of biobanking: the
66 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, op. cit. (64), p. 67.
67 Ministerial foreword to NDNAD Strategy Board report, December 2011.
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first is to ensure that data and samples that may be useful in the future are not lost; the
second is to address issues of consent and privacy that may be compromised by inappro-
priate retention or repurposing.
From its inception to its current iteration, the NDNAD transformed from a collection
of genetic samples to a computerized collection of genetic profiles. We could interpret the
destruction of samples and the deletion of many profiles during this transition as sacri-
fices to preserve the overall biovalue of the NDNAD, saving it from further political and
legal scrutiny under an evolving ethical regime. As we have seen, however, ethical ques-
tions interact in complex ways with questions of practical utility and economic costs and
benefits. For example, it is debatable whether nearly eight million samples were
destroyed because of their latent potential, because of their apparent lack of current use-
fulness, or because they cost ninety pence each per annum to store. Similarly, the oper-
ation of the new regime of exceptional and everyday ending of profiles from the database
is an imperfect work in progress, some way short of the neat procedural changes outlined
in legislation. Nevertheless, changes to the NDNAD have, at least in the short term,
closed debate about its legitimacy, temporarily securing the continued existence of the
overall collection. The biovalue of the database has been maintained whilst sidestepping
other potentially contentious issues, notably whether it is proportionate to retain indef-
initely the DNA records of adults convicted of any criminal offence. New powers such as
the Anti-social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 have expanded the retention
regime once more. Just as significantly, the cumulative acquisitive logic of the revised
inclusion criteria meant that by 2016 over five million people had profiles on the
NDNAD; this figure is higher than when the ECtHR made its ruling in 2008.
A series of developments mean that the current stabilization of the NDNAD may not
last long. In 2012 the government broke up the Forensic Science Service and privatized
and outsourced its work. A number of recent scandals have undermined public confi-
dence in the reliability of forensic science in the resulting commercialized climate.68
Moreover, new analytical techniques, for example using Y-chromosome markers and
using trace or ‘touch’ DNA (with its implications for the analysis of mixed-trace profiles
containing DNA from two or more persons), may require new ways of recording, storing
68 The most discussed recent case – as reported by The Guardian, The Independent and other UK media
outlets in 2017 – concerned the alleged manipulation of forensic data in 10,000 instances, since 2012, by
Trimega and its owner, Randox, commercial providers of forensic science services to police forces in the UK:
e.g. Nazia Parveen, ‘Manchester lab’s drug tests may have been manipulated’, The Guardian, 19 February
2017, at www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/19/manchester-lab-randox-drink-drug-tests-toxicology-
may-have-been-manipulated, accessed 2 May 2019; Hannah Devlin and Vikram Dodd, ‘Police review 10,000
cases in forensics data “manipulation” inquiry’, The Guardian, 21 November 2017, at www.theguardian.
com/uk-news/2017/nov/21/forensics-data-manipulation-may-have-affected-10000-cases, accessed 2 May 2019;
Lizzie Dearden, ‘Convictions in doubt as more than 10,000 cases could be affected by data manipulation at
forensics lab’, The Independent, 21 November 2019, at www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/forensic-labs-
data-manipulation-criminal-convictions-doubt-randox-testing-services-investigation-a8066966.html, accessed 2
May 2019; BBC News, ‘Randox forensics inquiry: police suspend drug-test contracts’, 27 November 2017, at
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-42144231, accessed 2 May 2019. Events prompted discussion in
the House of Lords on 27 November, as reflected in Hansard, ‘Randox and Trimega Laboratories’, 27
November 2017, vol. 787, UK Parliament, at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2017-11-27/debates/
C70A3F27-2CEE-4ED2-959D-DB853DDB2175/RandoxAndTrimegaLaboratories, accessed 2 May 2019.
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and profiling DNA. Controversially, police officers are also increasingly considering the
use of genetic material and data collected for other reasons, such as commercial geneal-
ogy or health testing, in their investigations. This move to utilize DNA originally donated
and curated outside a criminal-justice context potentially sidesteps the requirement for a
stand-alone dedicated and managed police forensic database; it also disrupts established
conventions of ethico-legal governance around DNA donation and collection.69
The potential future exploitation of other genetic collections is one example of a wider
phenomenon: developments open up opportunities for the sharing and repurposing of
data across institutional and scientific domains and the multiplication of different refer-
ence databases. This potentially challenges the boundaries, coherence, singularity and
integrity of the NDNAD, upon which much of its operation and governance have pre-
viously been predicated. This is an issue given increasing priority by the UK biometrics
commissioner, who seeks to broaden his remit to cover other (increasingly intercon-
nected) policing databases, including the facial image database which currently holds
almost twenty million images. This throws into sharp relief the ‘genetic exceptionalism’
evident in much of the past legal, ethical and political discourse around the NDNAD. As
discussed earlier, some claim that this exceptionalism lies in the capacity of DNA to defy
the categorical boundary between bodily material and bodily information. Yet the
sample/profile distinction, however confounding, has been central to the changes we
have described. The nature of an ending – along the continuum from crisis to conven-
tional – depends on the registers within which it is enacted. It is important to cultivate
curiosity about the relationships between and affordances of different modes of materi-
alization, and the labour and tensions inherent in the combination and translation
between these bodily and digital registers of bioinformation.
69 See, for example, J.W. Hazel, E.W. Clayton, B.A.Malin and C. Slobogin, ‘Is it time for a universal genetic
forensic database?’, Science (November 2018) 362(6417), pp. 898–900.
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